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Saving Stare Decisis: Preclusion, Precedent, and
Procedural Due Process
Max Minzner
ABSTRACT
Judgments do not bind nonparties. This core due process constraint
on issue preclusion means that courts can only adjudicate questions of
fact and law with respect to those individuals appearing in court.
However, the operation of stare decisis routinely extinguishes the rights
of nonparties without notice or an opportunity to be heard. This Article
examines the due process challenge to the operation of precedent. The
traditional justifications for applying a due process analysis only to
preclusion and not to precedent are inadequate. Instead of excepting
stare decisis from the operation of procedural due process, we should see
it as meeting those requirements. Using the Supreme Court’s analysis
from Mathews v. Eldridge, stare decisis can survive a due process
challenge based on the central value of third party reliance. While stare
decisis survives in general, applying notions of procedural due process
changes the traditional view of precedent in important situations. In
cases where reliance is nonexistent, or where the initial process was
corrupted, application of stare decisis may not withstand a due process
challenge.
I. INTRODUCTION
In June 2008, the Supreme Court handed down Taylor v.
Sturgell,1 the most recent in a series of decisions over the last ten
years reaffirming the due process limitations on nonparty preclusion.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit had applied a broad doctrine of preclusion to bar a Freedom
of Information Act2 claim on the theory that the plaintiff had been
 Associate Professor, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. Email: minzner@yu.edu. I would like to thank Margaret Lemos, Alex Reinert, and the
participants in the University of New Mexico Faculty Workshop for their comments and
suggestions.
1. 128 S. Ct. 2161 (2008).
2. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552–552b (2006).

597

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

4/12/2010 3:19 PM

2010

“virtually represented” by his friend in a prior lawsuit over an
identical FOIA claim.3 The Supreme Court reversed, quoting its own
sweeping language from Richards v. Jefferson County,4 which held
that the “application of claim and issue preclusion to nonparties runs
up against the deep-rooted tradition that everyone should have his
own day in court.”5 Richards itself reversed the Alabama Supreme
Court’s attempt to apply claim preclusion to plaintiffs who had not
been party to a prior lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of a
state tax regime. Even though the Alabama Supreme Court had
already decided the constitutionality of the tax in question,6 it could
not preclude the plaintiffs from relitigating the issue.7 Both Taylor
and Richards recognize strong due process protections for
nonparties, establishing a constitutional right to relitigate issues
already decided in prior lawsuits.
Simultaneously, though, both courts accepted, without analysis,
a different nonparty preclusion doctrine. The Court agreed that the
precedential effect of the prior lawsuit could bar the claim. The
Richards Court states, but does not explain, that “a state court’s
freedom to rely on prior precedent in rejecting a litigant’s claims
does not give it the freedom to bind a litigant to a prior judgment to
which he was not a party.”8 Taylor not only fails to draw a distinction
between stare decisis and preclusion, it explicitly relies on the value
of stare decisis in attempting to justify its preclusion conclusion:
“Stare decisis will quickly allow courts to swiftly dispose of repetitive
lawsuits.”9 The Supreme Court made no attempt to explain why the
broad “day in court” due process protections limiting the effect of
preclusion does not impose an identical limit on the effect of
precedent.10 The arguments offered in the academic literature for this
3. Taylor v. Blakely, 490 F.3d 965 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
4. 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996).
5. Taylor, 128 S. Ct. at 2171.
6. Jefferson County v. Richards, 662 So. 2d 1127, 1128 (Ala. 1995). The prior
challenge to the constitutionality of the tax scheme only raised state law questions while the
challenge in Richards itself dealt with a federal constitutional claim. Richards, 517 U.S. at 796.
7. Richards, 517 U.S. at 804–05.
8. Id. at 805.
9. Taylor, 128 S. Ct. at 2178.
10. This due process based challenge differs from the argument that stare decisis is
unconstitutional because it requires the Supreme Court sometimes to favor precedent over
original meaning or the claim that stare decisis is subject to abrogation by Congressional
statute. See, e.g., John Harrison, The Power of Congress over the Rules of Precedent, 50 DUKE L.J.
503 (2000); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Supreme Court’s Current Doctrine of Stare
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distinction between the due process restrictions on preclusion, but
not precedent, have been similarly unpersuasive.11
This Article attempts to fill this gap and save stare decisis by
grounding it in the Supreme Court’s procedural due process
jurisprudence. While not used explicitly in the preclusion literature,
the three-prong test from Mathews v. Eldridge12 provides a
mechanism to understand why we treat issue preclusion and stare
decisis differently from a due process standpoint. In particular, the
effect on absent nonparties does not simply endanger stare decisis
from a due process standpoint; it saves it as well. Because we expect
third parties to rely on prior decisions of courts, we have to bind
them as well.
The rest of the Article is organized as follows. Part II.A
outlines the Supreme Court case law on the due process constraints
on preclusion and contrasts it to the very limited case law from any
court raising due process concerns about stare decisis. Stretching
from Hansberry v. Lee to the recent decision in Taylor, the Court has
been clear that nonparties cannot suffer from the preclusive effects of
judgments, but courts have given little attention to the question of
whether the precedential effects of those decisions raise comparable
concerns. Part II.B analyzes the traditional justifications for drawing
a line between preclusion and precedent. Two primary arguments are
used to support the distinction. First, stare decisis is more flexible
than preclusion, leaving nonparties free to argue that the prior
decision was misguided and should not be followed. Second, courts
Decisis Require Adherence to the Supreme Court’s Current Doctrine of Stare Decisis?, 86 N.C. L.
REV. 1165 (2008); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of
Precedent, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 289, 289 (2005); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Irrepressible
Myth of Marbury, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2706, 2731–34 (2003); Michael Stokes Paulsen,
Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and
Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535 (2000); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Captain James T. Kirk and the
Enterprise of Constitutional Interpretation: Some Modest Proposals from the Twenty-Third
Century, 59 ALB. L. REV. 671, 679–81 (1995). But cf. Michael Abramowicz, Constitutional
Circularity, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1 (2002) (responding to these critiques).
11. See infra Part I.B. One recent article suggests that some aspects of stare decisis are
unconstitutional. Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV.
1011, 1012 (2003) (“I argue that the preclusive effect of precedent raises due process
concerns, and, on occasion, slides into unconstitutionality.”). While Professor Barrett and I
reach some different conclusions, her excellent analysis helped shape this Essay, especially Part
I.
12. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The Mathews factors are (1) the private interest affected by
the official action, (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation and the value of additional procedures,
and (3) the burden on the government from providing additional process. Id. at 335.
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may view issue preclusion as applying solely to questions of fact while
stare decisis covers questions of law. Neither of these arguments
carries the day.
Part III argues that while the line of cases from Hansberry to
Taylor would not support the current doctrine of stare decisis, we
can save the doctrine by considering it through the lens of the
Supreme Court’s three-part test in Mathews v. Eldridge. Mathews
provides a cost-benefit analysis for determining the necessary
procedure to be provided. Through this lens, the value of stare
decisis can allow it to survive in situations where preclusion falls.
Because we expect third parties to rely on decisions that receive
precedential effect, but not on those that merely receive preclusive
effects, this reliance interest tips the scale of the Mathews balancing
test.
Part IV explores the implications of applying Mathews to
preclusion and stare decisis. I argue that while Mathews saves stare
decisis generally, current aspects of the Supreme Court’s approach to
stare decisis still remain at risk. In particular, the Supreme Court has
treated reliance as merely a policy consideration in most cases
involving challenges to precedent. However, the key role reliance
plays in saving stare decisis means that, in cases where reliance does
not exist, due process may impose limits on courts’ ability to rely on
precedent. Second, applying due process constraints means that in
cases where the original process was fundamentally flawed, stare
decisis cannot survive.
II. THE DUE PROCESS CHALLENGE TO STARE DECISIS
A. Due Process and Preclusion
The term preclusion covers two distinct and related doctrines.
Claim preclusion, classically known as res judicata, bars the
relitigation of a claim that was, or should have been, raised in the
first lawsuit as long as the first lawsuit ended in a valid final judgment
on the merits.13 Claim preclusion requires that both the plaintiff and

13. If the judgment in the first lawsuit was in favor of the plaintiff, the claim is
extinguished, merges with the judgment, and then the plaintiff, if necessary, can sue on the
judgment. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 17–18. If the judgment was in
favor of the defendant, the judgment extinguished the claim and bars any future claim. Id. §
19. As a result, claim preclusion was classically referred to as the doctrine of merger and bar.
See Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 77 n.1 (1984).
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the defendant be identical in both suits.14 Claim preclusion defenses
frequently arise when a party has unsuccessfully litigated a claim in
the first lawsuit and later attempts to bring a different, related claim
in a subsequent lawsuit.15 Issue preclusion, in contrast, does not bar
the entire claim but simply precludes relitigating a discrete issue.16 As
long as the issue was actually litigated and decided in the first suit,
resolution of the issue was essential to the result, and there was a full
and fair opportunity to litigate, parties are barred from challenging
the resolution in the first litigation.17 Notably, unlike claim
preclusion, issue preclusion does not require the parties to be
identical. With the rise of nonmutual issue preclusion, parties can
benefit from an initial lawsuit in which they did not participate.18
While courts have generally abandoned the requirement that the
party benefitting from preclusion must have participated in the initial
lawsuit, there is no such flexibility with respect to the party burdened
by preclusion. The due process limits on nonparty preclusion are
staples of the traditional civil procedure course—a party is only
bound by a prior decision if they, or their privity, participated in the
original lawsuit.19 The Supreme Court recognized, though, that
14. See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 154 (1979) (“Preclusion of . . .
nonparties falls under the rubric of collateral estoppel rather than res judicata because the latter
doctrine presupposes identity between causes of action.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 17 (“A valid and final judgment is conclusive between the parties . . . .”).
15. See Alvear-Velez v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2008) (discussing the
rule against claim-splitting); Barrett ex rel. Estate of Barrett v. United States, 462 F.3d 28, 38
(1st Cir. 2006) (same).
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (“When an issue of fact or law is
actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is
essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the
parties, whether on the same or a different claim.”).
17. Id.; New Hampshire v. Maine, 542 U.S. 742, 749–50 (2001).
18. Justice Traynor’s opinion for the California Supreme Court in Bernhard v. Bank of
America, 122 P.2d 892, 895 (1942) was the key event in the decline of the mutuality
requirement for issue preclusion. At the federal level, the Supreme Court abandoned the
mutuality requirement in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation,
402 U.S. 313, 322 (1971) (permitting nonmutual defensive issue preclusion) and Parklane
Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979) (permitting nonmutual offensive issue
preclusion). While nonmutuality is now the majority rule, mutuality continues to exist.
Stogniew v. McQueen, 656 So. 2d 917, 919 (Fla. 1995) (holding that Florida law continues
to require mutuality); Quinn v. Monroe County, 330 F.3d 1320, 1330 (11th Cir. 2003)
(relying on Stogniew as good law).
19. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that due process requires that the party
suffering as a result of preclusion must have been a party in the initial lawsuit. The Supreme
Court’s due process case law surrounding preclusion stretches back to Hansberry v. Lee. 311
U.S. 32 (1940). Hansberry, a challenge to the issue preclusive effect of a fraudulent stipulation
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preclusion was appropriate in certain situations, such as properly
constituted class actions, where parties absent from the litigation
were adequately represented by the parties who were present. Lower
courts repeatedly attempted to expand the scope of this “adequate
representation” exception,20 and the Supreme Court has frequently
rebuffed these attempts.21
Most recently, the Court handed down Taylor v. Sturgell, which
involved a dispute between two airplane enthusiasts and the FAA.
Greg Herrick, the owner of an antique F-45 airplane, sought
information in a FOIA request from the FAA in order to help him
restore his plane.22 The manufacturer of the airplane, the Fairchild
Engine and Airplane Corporation, had submitted technical data to
the FAA in 1935 as part of the process of getting the plane certified
for manufacture and sale.23 The FAA retained all of this information
but denied the FOIA request on the theory that the information fell
within the FOIA trade secret exception.24 Herrick filed suit in district
court, arguing that the manufacturer had surrendered its trade secret
claim by submitting a 1955 letter to the FAA’s predecessor agency
authorizing documents to be released to the public for use in making
repairs or replacement parts. The district court rejected this
in a prior lawsuit, set up a two-part holding. First, due process prohibits binding nonparties,
and second, class actions are only effective when the representative parties adequately represent
the class members. Id.
20. Most recently, several circuits have applied a “virtual representation” theory,
permitting claim preclusion when the party in the second lawsuit was similarly situated to the
party in the first lawsuit, an approach usually dated back to the Fifth Circuit’s decision in
Aerojet v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1975). The Circuits varied in the requirements for
virtual representation. See, e.g., Taylor v. Blakely, 490 F.3d 965, 971 (D.C. Cir. 2007);
Gonzalez v. Banco Cent. Corp., 27 F.3d 751 (1st Cir. 1994). For a historical justification of
the virtual representation theory, see Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the “Day in Court” Ideal
and Nonparty Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 193 (1992). The Supreme Court’s decision in
Taylor likely represents the end of the virtual representation line of cases.
21. For instance, in 1996, the Supreme Court overturned the Alabama Supreme Court’s
decision in Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793 (1996) (discussed in the introduction),
even though the lower court concluded that the plaintiffs in the first action adequately
represented those in the second action. Just three years later, in South Central Bell Telephone
Co. v. Alabama, 526 U.S. 160 (1999), the Court came to the same conclusion that the state
could not rely on adequate representation even when the lawyers were identical and the
plaintiffs in the second action were aware of the first lawsuit.
22. Taylor, 128 S. Ct. at 2168.
23. See Herrick v. Garvey, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1322 (D. Colo. 2000).
24. Id. at 1323. FOIA exemption 4 permits the government to withhold “trade secrets
and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or
confidential.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4).
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argument on two theories. First, since the documents were never
released to the public, they retain trade secret status; and second,
even if the documents had lost trade secret status as a result of the
1955 letter, they regained it when the manufacturer successfully
reversed the waiver of trade secret status by objecting to the FAA
after Herrick’s FOIA request.25 The Tenth Circuit affirmed.26 While
it disagreed with the district court’s conclusion on the waiver of
trade secret status, it accepted the FAA’s argument that the
reclamation of trade secret status was successful.27 Notably, the
Tenth Circuit merely assumed, and did not hold, that trade secret
status could be reclaimed and further assumed that the timing of the
reclamation of the statutes was irrelevant.28 The FAA and the
manufacturer were allowed to argue that the status had been
reclaimed even though the reclamation took place after Herrick filed
the FOIA request.
Enter Herrick’s friend Brent Taylor, another airplane enthusiast.
After submitting his own FOIA request to which the FAA failed to
respond, he filed suit in the Federal District Court in the District of
Columbia making arguments identical to those raised by Herrick.29
In addition, he raised the arguments waived by Herrick in the court
of appeals, claiming both that the manufacturer could not revive
trade secret status for the documents and that even if revival was
possible, it could not happen after the FOIA request took place.30
The district court dismissed on a virtual representation theory since
Herrick and Taylor were close associates, were represented by the
same lawyer, and had apparently shared litigation documents.31 The
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed, announcing its own
version of the virtual representation test.32
The Supreme Court reversed and clearly identified the limited
situations in which nonparty preclusion is appropriate. The Taylor
Court outlined six categories of nonparties who can suffer as a result

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Herrick, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 1327–29.
Herrick v. Garvey, 298 F.3d 1184 (10th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1194.
Id. at 1194 n.10.
Taylor v. Blakely, 490 F.3d 965, 968 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
Taylor v. Sturgell, 128 S. Ct. 2161, 2168 (2008).
Taylor, 490 F.3d at 969.
Id. at 972.
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of litigation.33 First, nonparties who agreed to be bound are
precluded even if they did not initially participate.34 Second,
individuals who assumed control of the litigation, even if they did
not act as a party, are bound.35 Third, nonparties to the first suit who
act in a representative capacity for someone who was a party in the
initial litigation can be precluded.36 Fourth, nonparty preclusion can
operate pursuant to a special statutory scheme, such as bankruptcy or
probate.37 Fifth, nonparties in particular legal relationships with
parties can be precluded.38 Finally, in certain situations, nonparties

33. The Court drew on the Restatement in establishing these categories. Taylor, 128 S.
Ct. at 2172 n.6.
34. Id. at 2172; see also Sampson v. Sony Corp. of Am., 434 F.2d 312, 315 (2d Cir.
1970) (holding parties bound by stipulation that the decision in a separate lawsuit would
resolve their claims); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 40.
35. Taylor, 128 S. Ct. at 2173. The classic example of this type of nonparty preclusion
arose in Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979), where the United States government
directed and financed litigation by a government contractor in a Montana state court lawsuit
challenging the constitutionality of a state gross receipt tax. Even though the federal
government was not a party, the Supreme Court found that the state court decision that the
tax did not violate the Supremacy Clause had preclusive effect in a later federal court lawsuit
since the government “exercised control” over the state court litigation. Id. at 155.
36. Taylor, 128 S. Ct. at 2173. The canonical preclusion-by-representation case is
Chicago Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co. v. Schendel, 270 U.S. 611 (1926). In Schendel, the
administrator of the estate of a deceased employee brought an action against the railroad
employer under the Federal Employer’s Liability Act. The railroad had previously brought a
worker’s compensation proceeding against the employee’s widow, the sole beneficiary of the
estate, in which the arbitrator determined that the employee was engaged in intrastate, rather
than interstate commerce. Id. at 614–15. The Supreme Court found the determination with
respect to interstate commerce to be preclusive in the second suit even though the parties were
formally different since “[t]he essential consideration is that it is the right of the widow, and of
no one else, which was presented and adjudicated in both courts.” Id. at 618.
37. Taylor, 128 S. Ct. at 2173. Probate and bankruptcy both adjudicate the rights of
absent parties. Claims against estates and bankrupts are lost if not properly presented. See Tulsa
Prof’l Collection Serv., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988) (probate); NLRB v. Bildisco &
Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 529–30 n.10 (1984) (bankruptcy). The Supreme Court has not clearly
explained why nonparty preclusion is constitutional in these cases, but the answer probably lies
in the need for finality. In this way, these proceedings can be seen as another example of
Mathews-style balancing where the value of finality is allowed to overcome the general rule
against nonparty preclusion. See infra Part II for a broader discussion of Mathews.
38. Taylor, 128 S. Ct. at 2172. Classically these relationships have been called “privity,”
although the Taylor Court recognized that privity had lost its content and had simply come to
stand for the proposition that nonparty preclusion was appropriate. Id. at 2172. See also, e.g.,
Nash Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 640 F.2d 484, 493 (4th Cir. 1981) (providing an example
of a collecting case); Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419, 421 (3d Cir. 1950)
(Goodrich, J., concurring).
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adequately represented by the participants in the initial lawsuit may
be bound.39
If we accept that the same due process standards outlined in
Taylor and its predecessors apply to both issue preclusion and
preclusion by precedent, how does stare decisis fare?40 Not
particularly well. Consider again the facts of Taylor. If the Tenth
Circuit had actually held that trade secret status could be
“reclaimed” under FOIA, Taylor holds that it would be
unconstitutional to find that Taylor was issue precluded41 from
relitigating this question.42 However, Taylor would clearly be barred
by stare decisis from relitigating this issue43 in the courts of the
Tenth Circuit, at least until the level of en banc review.44

39. Taylor, 128 S. Ct. at 2172.
40. One difficulty with applying the analysis in Taylor to different contexts is that the
Court has never clearly explained why nonparty preclusion is so unacceptable aside from the
“deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court.” Id. at 2171
(quoting Richards v. Jefferson, 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996)). Prior case law takes a similar
approach, simply citing to the history without explaining it. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32,
40 (1940) (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878)).
41. One might try to distinguish this hypothetical on the grounds that Taylor and its
most relevant predecessor cases involve claim preclusion, and therefore, perhaps the due
process standards are reduced for issue preclusion. The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence,
though, leaves no room for this argument. Taylor views issue preclusion and claim preclusion
as identical. “A person who was not a party to a suit generally has not had a ‘full and fair
opportunity to litigate’ the claims and issues settled in that suit. The application of claim and
issue preclusion to nonparties thus runs up against the ‘deep rooted historic tradition that
everyone should have his own day in court.’” Taylor, 128 S. Ct. at 2171 (quoting Richards,
517 U.S. at 798). The Supreme Court’s previous case law on issue preclusion reaches exactly
the same conclusion. “Some litigants—those who never appeared in a prior action—may not
be collaterally estopped without litigating the issue. They have never had a chance to present
their evidence and arguments on the claim. Due process prohibits estopping them despite one
or more existing adjudications of the identical issue which stand squarely against their
position.” Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971).
42. Nor do any of the Taylor exceptions apply differently when seen through the lens of
issue preclusion or preclusion by precedent. The relationship between Taylor and Herrick
remains the same. Taylor still would not have agreed to be bound by the first litigation, would
not have taken control of the initial litigation, and would not be acting as Herrick’s
representative. No special statutory scheme exists to permit nonparty preclusion. Since Taylor
does not fall within any of the six categories for purposes of issue preclusion, it is hard to argue
that he would qualify for one of them for purposes of preclusion by precedent.
43. Arguably, a party is not barred from relitigating an issue by stare decisis; they are
simply prevented from winning on the point. This argument hardly distinguishes preclusion
and precedent sufficiently for constitutional purposes. In fact, stare decisis is arguably more
binding in some ways than issue preclusion. Preclusion is a defense and must be raised in a
defendant’s answer or is waived. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8. The argument that the stare decisis
effect of a prior decision bars a claim, though, can be raised on a motion to dismiss under
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Despite this straightforward argument, courts have seldom
faced the question whether stare decisis is unconstitutional and have
not taken the argument very seriously when presented with it.45 The
following section deals with the traditional justifications for treating
issue preclusion and stare decisis differently and argues that they are
inadequate.
B. The Traditional Distinctions Between Preclusion and Precedent
Two major justifications have been put forth to explain the more
lenient due process treatment of stare decisis when compared to issue
preclusion. The first is the alleged flexibility of stare decisis.46 In the
cases where it applies, issue preclusion acts as an absolute bar to
relitigation of the identical issue. Parties cannot argue that the issue
should be reexamined simply because the outcome is wrong.47 In
contrast, stare decisis theoretically leaves courts open to revisit the
legal issue. Courts can and do change their mind on legal questions,
and under the Federal Rules, parties are free to make any
nonfrivolous argument in favor of changing the law.48 Similarly,
parties can also distinguish prior decisions, arguing that the legal
issues are actually not the same between the two suits.

Rule 12. A defendant need not file an answer, and if not raised then, it can be raised up to,
during, or after trial. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(2).
44. The Tenth Circuit, like other circuits, follows the rule that one panel cannot
overrule a prior panel. See Thompson R2-J Sch. Dist. v. Luke P. ex rel. Jeff P., 540 F.3d 1143,
1150 n.6 (10th Cir. 2008).
45. See Kent v. Johnson, 821 F.2d 1220, 1228 (6th Cir. 1987). On occasion district
courts have been reversed for giving decisions from other district courts undue weight. See Nw.
Forest Res. Counsel v. Dombeck, 107 F.3d 897, 898 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Colby v. J.C. Penney
Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1123 (7th Cir. 1987). See generally Barrett, supra note 11, at 1026–27
(discussing Dombeck and Colby). Additionally, in Atlantis Development Corp. v. United States,
the court found intervention as of right proper on the theory that the intervening party might
be affected by the decision as a matter of stare decisis even though they would not be bound as
a nonparty. 379 F.2d 818, 829 (5th Cir. 1967). For a more extensive discussion of
intervention and stare decisis, see infra at Part II.B.
46. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 cmt. i (1982) (noting that stare
decisis is “less limiting” than preclusion because courts can revisit issues); 18 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4425 (3d ed. 1998) (noting that
stare decisis is “flexible”).
47. See Federated Dep’t Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981); Consol. Edison
Co. v. Bodman, 449 F.3d 1254, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Goss v. Goss, 722 F.2d 599, 605
(10th Cir. 1983).
48. See FED R. CIV. P. 11.
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The second primary defense of the different treatments of issue
preclusion and stare decisis turns on the distinction between fact and
law.49 Perhaps issue preclusion simply applies to questions of fact
while stare decisis governs questions of law, and while due process
prohibits binding nonparties to factual determinations made by the
court, there is no due process violation in binding nonparties to the
legal determinations of a prior court.
Both of these justifications are deeply flawed.50 Stare decisis
doctrine, as it is now applied in some courts, is far from flexible.
While it is true that the United States Supreme Court retains the
option of reopening any question of law presented to it, other courts
do not have that flexibility. First, as a matter of vertical stare decisis,
decisions of higher courts bind lower courts.51 The United States
Supreme Court has frequently made clear that lower courts are not
free to reexamine its decisions, even when intervening precedent
severely calls them into question.52 Furthermore, horizontal stare
decisis in the United States Courts of Appeal is similarly inflexible. In
all circuits, decisions of prior panels bind current panels even if they
are wrong.53 These legal questions are not open to reargument on
the theory that they are incorrect. At the very least, these rules
require nonparties to the first litigation to seek review at a higher
level than would have been required had the first lawsuit never taken
place.
Perhaps even more troubling, the notion of flexibility assumes
that review is available within the court system considering the
second case. In situations where jurisdictions are not applying their
own law, flexibility is effectively eliminated. Take for example,
49. See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 162 (1979); United States v. Moser,
266 U.S. 236, 242 (1924); 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 46, § 4425 n.3.
50. Professor Barrett persuasively argues that these justifications fail. See Barrett, supra
note 11, at 1043–49.
51. See Stefanie A. Lindquist & Frank B. Cross, Empirically Testing Dworkin’s Chain
Novel Theory: Studying the Path of Precedent, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1156, 1161 (2005) (drawing
the distinction between vertical and horizontal precedent). For the seminal article analyzing
the binding effect of decisions on lower courts, see Even H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior
Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817 (1993).
52. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 207 (1997) (“The Court neither
acknowledges nor holds that other courts should ever conclude that its more recent cases have,
by implication, overruled an earlier precedent. Rather, lower courts should follow the case
which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.”
(citing Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989)).
53. See Barrett, supra note 11, at 1017 n.19.
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Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publications,54 in which an interviewee for a
magazine article brought a breach of contract action against the
magazine publisher and the journalist, claiming that the reporter did
not honor her promise of anonymity.55 Sitting in diversity, the
federal court was bound to apply Minnesota state substantive law.56
The Minnesota Supreme Court had recently held that confidentiality
agreements between sources and reporters did not constitute a
legally enforceable contract under state law.57 The Court of Appeals
(correctly) viewed this decision as absolutely binding under Erie.58
The plaintiff’s rights were extinguished by the prior case in as
inflexible a manner as would have occurred had she been a party.59
At least theoretically, the plaintiff could have sought certification
to the Minnesota courts to revisit the question. Minnesota, like many
states, has adopted the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law
Act,60 allowing federal courts to certify questions of state law to the
state supreme court.61 Certification, though, is not available for all
states;62 and, more to the point, is strongly disfavored under precisely
these circumstances. Certification is a process designed to clarify the
law and is specifically disallowed when a party wants to argue that a
previous decision was incorrect and should be changed.63 A party in

54. 939 F.2d 578 (8th Cir. 1991).
55. Id. at 579–80.
56. Id. at 582. See generally Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (providing
the standard regarding whether state substantive law should apply).
57. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199, 203 (Minn. 1990), rev’d on other
grounds, 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
58. Ruzicka, 939 F.2d at 582.
59. While the plaintiff in Ruzicka selected the federal forum and could have filed in state
court in an effort to preserve her opportunity to reargue the question before the Minnesota
Supreme Court, the defendant could simply have removed the case to federal court under 28
U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2006). No defendant was a Minnesota citizen. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)
(2006).
60. MINN. STAT. § 480.065 (2008).
61. See 17A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 46, § 4248 (discussing history of certification);
Jonathan Remy Nash, Examining the Power of Federal Courts to Certify Questions of State Law,
88 CORNELL L. REV. 1672, 1687–90 (2003).
62. 17A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 46, § 4248.
63. Id. (“If the state court has already said what the law is, a federal court, which
disagrees with that statement of the law, should not certify a question in the hope of
persuading the state court to change its mind.”); see also Tarr v. Manchester Ins. Co., 544 F.2d
14, 15 (1st Cir. 1976) (“The purpose of certification is to ascertain what the state law is, not,
when the state court has already said what it is, to afford a party an opportunity to persuade the
court to say something else.”).
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federal court sitting in diversity (or in a state court applying the law
of a different state) is inflexibly bound by the out-of-jurisdiction
precedent.
The ability to distinguish precedent also fails to save stare
decisis.64 Cases certainly can be distinguished factually, and recent
empirical work examining the binding nature of precedent has
reached mixed conclusions.65 It is clear, though, that for the parties
within the scope of a decision, the decision still has bite. The plaintiff
in Ruzicka had no plausible argument to distinguish the prior
decision. She still bases a contract claim on an agreement between
source and reporter—exactly the facts rejected by the Minnesota
courts.
Finally, the distinction between fact and law does not save stare
decisis. The distinction between fact and law, while once true, is no
longer so clear. The First Restatement of Judgments applied issue
preclusion purely to questions of fact,66 a rule the Supreme Court
followed as well.67 More modern doctrine has changed this
approach. Under the Second Restatement, issue preclusion is

64. See Barrett, supra note 11, at 1020; Lea Brilmayer, The Sociology of Article III: A
Response to Professor Brilmayer: A Reply, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1727, 1728–29 (1980).
65. See Lindquist & Cross, supra note 51, at 1203–05 (“Our research suggests that
precedent has some constraining effect on judicial decisions, but not that precedent is the
overriding determinant. Precedent appears to have a moderately constraining effect on judicial
freedom.”).
66. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS § 68 (1942); Geoffrey C. Hazard,
Preclusion as to Issues of Law, 70 IOWA L. REV. 81, 89 (1984) (explaining the historic
development of preclusion of issues of law).
67. In United States v. Moser, the plaintiff had entered the Naval Academy during the
Civil War and had successfully argued in previous litigation that this service constituted
“service during the civil war” within the meaning of a statute providing increased benefits for
veterans meeting that requirement. 266 U.S. 236, 240 (1924). When he again brought suit
for enhanced benefits, the Court found this decision preclusive because while preclusion “does
not apply to unmixed questions of law . . . a fact, question or right distinctly adjudged in the
original action cannot be disputed in a subsequent action.” Id. at 242 (emphasis omitted). The
Court did not explain how to draw the line between the “unmixed question of law” and the
“fact, question, or right.” See id. The Court’s opinion in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948), further struggled with these issues. In Sunnen, the taxpayer had
assigned royalties from patents to his wife in a series of contracts and had succeeded in previous
litigation in avoiding tax liability for the royalties on those patents. Id. at 595–96. The
Supreme Court, though, viewed each contract as involving “separable” facts making preclusion
inappropriate. Id. at 601. This separable facts doctrine has received substantial criticism. See 18
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 46, § 4425.
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available whether the question is factual or legal.68 The Supreme
Court has followed the Second Restatement and applied issue
preclusion to unmixed questions of law.69 The Court reached the
Second Restatement result in United States v. Stauffer Chemical
Co.70 In Stauffer, the Environmental Protection Agency had
attempted to inspect one of the defendant’s plants in Tennessee
using private contractors along with EPA employees.71 The Clean Air
Act72 only permitted “authorized representatives” to participate in
inspections,73 and Stauffer contended that private contractors were
not within the scope of the statute.74 Stauffer previously had litigated
this question successfully against the EPA with respect to an
inspection in Wyoming.75 The Supreme Court found preclusion to
be appropriate, recognizing that “the doctrine of collateral estoppel
can apply to preclude relitigation of both issues of law and issues of
fact.”76
Similarly, courts frequently apply a version of stare decisis to
certain types of factual decisions.77 The clearest example of facts
68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982). “[T]he phrase ‘issue of fact
or law’ has been substituted for ‘question of fact’ so that the Section is now applicable to
questions of law and law application as well as questions of fact.” Id. § 27 Reporter’s Notes.
69. In Montana v. United States, the Court held that, having sponsored state court
litigation over the constitutionality of a state tax, the United States was issue precluded in
federal court. 440 U.S. 147, 156–62 (1979). The Court accepted the Second Restatement’s
limitation on preclusion “when issues of law arise in successive actions involving unrelated
subject matter.” Id. at 162–63; see also Barrett, supra note 11, at 1050.
70. 464 U.S. 165 (1984).
71. Id. at 166.
72. See 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(2) (2006); Stauffer, 464 U.S. at 166.
73. 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(2).
74. Stauffer, 464 U.S. at 166.
75. Id. at 166–67. This outcome further highlights the close relationship between
preclusion and stare decisis in the context of the absolutely binding nature of circuit precedent.
The first lawsuit between the parties was in the Tenth Circuit. Stauffer Chem. Co. v. EPA, 647
F.2d 1075 (10th Cir. 1981). The second suit took place in the Sixth Circuit. United States v.
Stauffer Chem. Co., 684 F.2d 1174 (6th Cir. 1982). Had the first suit also taken place in the
Sixth Circuit, there would have been no question of preclusion. The EPA, Stauffer Chemical,
and everyone else in the circuit simply would have been bound by the decision.
76. Stauffer, 464 U.S. at 170–71. The Court left open the possibility that the Moser
exception survives but was critical of it: “Admittedly the purpose underlying the exception for
‘unmixed questions of law’ . . . is far from clear. But whatever its purpose or extent, we think
that there is no reason to apply it here . . . .” Id. at 172.
77. See, e.g., Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. One 25,900 Square Foot More or Less
Parcel of Land, 766 F.2d 685, 689 (2d Cir. 1985) (concluding that court was bound by a
prior determination that the parcel of land had access to a public road); see also 18 WRIGHT ET
AL., supra note 46, § 4449 n.30 (discussing Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp.).
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serving as precedent is what Kenneth Culp Davis initially identified
as “legislative facts,” those not relating to the immediate parties but
instead underlying the decisions about law and policy.78 The classic
example of legislative fact may be the use of the social science data
relating to the effect of segregation on African-American children in
Brown v. Board of Education.79 The determination that segregation
has negative consequences is indisputably factual, but certainly binds
nonparties. The clearest demonstration of this comes from the cases
in which Southern courts attempted to “revisit” the facts underlying
the social science data and conclude, on preclusion grounds, that
school systems not parties to Brown were not bound by the factual
decision, an argument correctly rejected by the court of appeals.80
Brown is not an outlier; courts often treat prior conclusions about
social science data as binding.81 It is hard to see how we could
interpret these holdings as legal in any coherent way.
Both the flexibility and law-versus-fact justifications suffer from a
more significant flaw. Courts have not offered a coherent theoretical
explanation as to why they deserve such different treatment. In the
case of flexibility, stare decisis is certainly designed to have an impact
on nonparties. The point of the doctrine is to make relitigation of
previously decided issues more difficult, and as a result, the doctrine
only escapes constitutional suspicion to the extent that it does not
serve its purposes. Similarly, courts have not explained why factual
and legal questions should be treated so differently. From the point
78. See Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative
Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402–04 (1942).
79. 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954). For articles discussing the Brown use of social
science data as an example of a legislative fact, see, e.g., Bryan L. Adamson, Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 52(A) as an Ideological Weapon?, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1025, 1061 (2007);
Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 107 YALE L.J. 1535,
1556–57 (1998); John Monahan et al., Contextual Evidence of Gender Discrimination: The
Ascendance of “Social Frameworks,” 94 VA. L. REV. 1715, 1720–21 (2008) (“Judicial
acceptance of social science research as a form a legislative fact was most famously embodied in
Brown v. Board of Education.”).
80. See Stell v. Savannah-Chatam County Bd. of Educ., 220 F. Supp. 667, 680 (S.D.
Ga. 1963), rev’d, 333 F.2d 55, 61 (5th Cir. 1964) (“[T]he District Court was bound by the
decision of the Supreme Court in Brown. We reiterate that no inferior federal court may refrain
from acting as required by that decision even if such a court should conclude that the Supreme
Court erred either as to its facts or as to the law.”).
81. See Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Facts: Scientific Methodology as Legal
Precedent, 76 CAL. L. REV. 877, 885 (1988); Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social
Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559, 562 (1987) (collecting
cases).
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of view of the losing litigant, the effect of the doctrines works
identically. Both bar a party from arguing a position based on the
result of prior lawsuit to which he was not a party.
In Part III, I try to fill this theoretical gap. While the Court has
never used it, we have a well-established doctrinal framework we can
use to preserve stare decisis. Both the flexibility and the law-fact
distinction fit well into the Supreme Court’s test from Mathews v.
Eldridge,82 which gives us a mechanism to weigh the value of
additional procedures against their costs.
III. SAVING STARE DECISIS
Despite these arguments, Taylor cannot mark the end of stare
decisis. The Court explicitly relies on the ongoing value of stare
decisis as a justification for its decisions in Taylor and Richards, using
the theory that the stare decisis effect of a ruling will prevent the
possibility of frivolous and burdensome litigation.83 Viewed through
the narrow lens of the due process analysis in preclusion cases,
however, stare decisis appears to have serious constitutional
problems.
Mathews v. Eldridge is the saving grace for stare decisis. The
Supreme Court’s decision in Mathews analyzed procedural due
process through the lens of a cost-benefit analysis.84 Mathews requires
courts to consider the private interest affected by the court’s
decision, the risk of an erroneous deprivation as a result of the
procedures that are in place, the added value that would be provided
by any additional process, and the Government’s interest, including
the cost of additional process.85 Additional process is only required
when the increased likelihood of a correct outcome outweighs the
cost of the process.86 This Part outlines when the Mathews test
applies and why applying Mathews to preclusion and stare decisis
82. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
83. Taylor v. Sturgell, 128 S. Ct. 2161, 2178 (2008) (“[S]tare decisis will allow courts
swiftly to dispose of repetitive suits brought in the same circuit.”); Richards v. Jefferson
County, 517 U.S. 793, 805 (1996) (“A state court’s freedom to rely on prior precedent in
rejecting a litigant’s claims does not afford it similar freedom to bind a litigant to a prior
judgment to which he was not a party.”).
84. 424 U.S. at 334–35. For an excellent recent summary of Mathews, see Alexander
Blair-Stanek, Understanding Bell Atlantic v. Twombly as Mathews v. Eldridge Applied to
Discovery, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1, 8–16 (forthcoming 2010).
85. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
86. Id. at 348.
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explains our differential treatment of the impact of prior decisions on
nonparties.87
A. When Mathews Applies
Mathews, of course, is not universally applicable to all questions
of due process under the Constitution, even though the Court has
described it as “a general approach for testing challenged state
procedures”88 under the Due Process Clause. The Supreme Court
has never clearly outlined which type of due process questions are
subject to the Mathews calculation. For instance, the Court has
rejected claims that Mathews applies, as a general matter, in the
criminal context or in the context for military courts-martial.89 Even
in some civil contexts, the Court has refused to apply Mathews.90
However, in order to save stare decisis, we do not need a broad
theory outlining when the Mathews factors apply. We simply need to
know that it applies in cases where nonparties lose important legal
rights without being present. The Supreme Court has already
accepted arguments that Mathews applies to these facts in
Connecticut v. Doehr.91 Doehr is the capstone case in the Supreme
Court’s preliminary remedies jurisprudence. Over the course of two
87. Mathews has frequently been subject to academic criticism. Professor Mashaw
immediately critiqued the overly utilitarian nature of the Mathews balancing, arguing that the
Due Process Clause reflected values other than a purely functional ideal. See Jerry L. Mashaw,
The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v.
Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 50–51 (1976). If
one takes this view, of course, my proposed save for stare decisis is unsuccessful. The more
rigorous a due process standard one imposes, the more endangered stare decisis becomes.
88. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 599 (1979).
89. See Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 177 (1994) (military); Medina v.
California, 505 U.S. 437, 445 (1992) (criminal). Weiss and Medina both suggest that the
decision not to apply Mathews arises out of concerns of deference. In both cases, the Supreme
Court selected a less restrictive standard than Mathews in order to defer to legislative expertise.
See Weiss, 510 U.S. at 177 (“Judicial deference thus ‘is at its apogee’ when reviewing
congressional decisionmaking in [the military context].”) (quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 453
U.S. 57, 70 (1981)); Medina, 505 U.S. at 445–46 (“[B]ecause the States have considerable
expertise in matters of criminal procedure and the criminal process is grounded in centuries of
common-law tradition, it is appropriate to exercise substantial deference to legislative
judgments in this area.”). No such deference argument applies in the stare decisis context.
90. In the case of due process challenges to the sufficiency of the notice provided to a
defendant, the Supreme Court has retained a more flexible rule of reasonableness rather than
the three-prong analysis from Mathews. See, e.g., Dusnebery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161,
168 (2007) (“[W]e have never viewed Mathews as announcing an all-embracing test for
deciding due process claims.”).
91. 501 U.S. 1 (1991).

613

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

4/12/2010 3:19 PM

2010

decades, the Supreme Court refined its analysis of when parties could
be deprived of their rights without notice and a hearing.
Starting with Sniadach v. Family Finance,92 the Court found that
due process prohibited certain types of ex parte preliminary remedies.
While the doctrine wandered through a series of cases,93 Doehr
eventually concludes that the three-prong Mathews test governs these
types of cases.
Doehr involved a challenge to Connecticut’s ex parte lien
procedure, which allowed plaintiffs to attach real property owned by
the defendant upon submission of an affidavit demonstrating
probable cause to “sustain the validity of the plaintiff’s claims.”94 The
Court used the Mathews framework to invalidate the process.95 First,
the Court found that the temporary cloud placed on the landowner’s
title constituted a deprivation of property under the meaning of the
Due Process Clause.96 Next, the Court accepted the argument that
the risk of erroneous deprivation was high, since the court issuing
the lien could only review a one-sided complaint and affidavit. Even
though the state provided additional protections, including a quick
postattachment hearing, judicial review, and a double damages
remedy in case of error, the lack of a preattachment hearing was fatal
to the statute.97 Finally, the Court concluded that the plaintiff’s lack
of a preexisting interest in the property, as well as the absence of any
exigent circumstances, gave him too limited an interest in obtaining
the remedy without notice and a hearing.98
The decision in Doehr to apply the Mathews framework in the
context of preliminary remedies strongly suggests that it is

92. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
93. Sniadach itself appears to apply a set of rules that varies based on the nature of the
property: “[W]ages . . . [are] a specialized type of property.” Id. at 340. Fuentes v. Shevin, in
contrast, explicitly states that notice and prior hearing are always required absent
“extraordinary situations.” 407 U.S. 67, 82 (1972). Just two years later, though, the Court
upheld a preliminary remedies statute lacking a preattachment hearing on facts virtually
identical to those of Fuentes. See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant, 416 U.S. 600 (1974). Finally, in
1975, the Court again disapproved of a statute based on the absence of adequate state
procedures. See N. Ga. Finishing v. Di-Chem, 419 U.S. 601 (1978). The decision to apply
Mathews here was almost certainly an attempt to clean up precedent that was very difficult to
reconcile.
94. Doehr, 501 U.S. at 5.
95. Id. at 10.
96. Id. at 11–12.
97. Id. at 12–15.
98. Id. at 16.
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appropriate to judge stare decisis and preclusion under the same
standard. All three of these situations involve a court’s determination
about the rights of parties who do not appear before them. In the
preliminary remedies context, the resolution of the rights of the
absent party is precisely the point of the proceeding, while in stare
decisis and preclusion, the impact on nonparties is a collateral effect
of the original judgment.
Indeed, if anything, the due process concerns surrounding stare
decisis and issue preclusion are potentially more troubling than those
that arise in the preliminary remedies cases. Doehr and its
predecessors make clear that due process is implicated even when the
initial determination is reversible at a later post-seizure hearing. The
existence of a later opportunity to relitigate the court’s order is
relevant to the due process calculation under the Mathews analysis,
but it is not determinative.
B. Applying Mathews
How does Mathews help explain the difference between the
binding effect of stare decisis and issue preclusion? The difference
cannot lie in the first step relating to the interest affected by the
decision. The party denied victory in the second lawsuit due to the
outcome of the first lawsuit is affected exactly the same way
regardless of the label applied to the type of preclusion. Nor is there
a difference in the second Mathews step. Additional process is hardly
more likely to correct a prior erroneous decision as a matter of
preclusion than as a matter of stare decisis. In fact, there is every
reason to believe the opposite is true, especially in questions of
historical fact. Revisiting issues will often achieve error correction in
the context of precedent but not preclusion. Consider a classic
example of issue preclusion involving a three-car accident and a
factual question about whether a traffic light was red or green. If two
drivers litigate the question of the color of the light to a decision,
that factual question will not preclude the third driver in a later
lawsuit. Even though memories fade and evidence might disappear in
the interim, the third driver will be permitted to relitigate the
question of the color of the light in a lawsuit brought years later. As
a general matter, however, it is not much more difficult for a court
to reconsider a pure question of law years after the question first
arose. Viewed through the lens of the second Mathews prong, issue
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preclusion and precedent may be exactly reversed in their effect on
third parties.99
Instead, the difference must lie in the third prong—the private or
governmental interest. The third prong of Mathews focuses on the
government or private interest in not providing additional process.
Some of the classic benefits usually ascribed to stare decisis do not
successfully distinguish precedent and preclusion. For instance, stare
decisis can be seen as a theory protecting institutional legitimacy by
building confidence in courts through preventing different outcomes
in similar cases,100 or as a mechanism of judicial efficiency, allowing
courts to avoid relitigating issues when the outcome is likely to be
the same the second time around.101 Neither of these arguments,
though, distinguishes precedent and preclusion. If courts lose
legitimacy from inconsistent decisions, the cost should be the same
regardless of the label applied to the inconsistency. If courts can save
costs by avoiding relitigation of issues, the savings is identical for
both preclusion and precedent.102

99. I thank Margaret Lemos for this insight.
100. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992); Moragne v.
States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970) (identifying as a goal of stare decisis “the
necessity of maintaining public faith in the judiciary as a source of impersonal and reasoned
judgments”). Cf. Michael Abramowicz, Constitutional Circularity, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1, 27
(2002) (reading Casey’s language about judicial integrity as “related to but independent of
principles of stare decisis”).
101. See, e.g., Moragne, 398 U.S at 403 (stare decisis furthers “fair and expeditious
adjudication by eliminating the need to relitigate every relevant proposition in every case”);
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149 (1921) (“[T]he labor
of judges would be increased almost to the breaking point if every past decision could be
reopened in every case.”); William S. Consovoy, The Rehnquist Court and the End of
Constitutional Stare Decisis: Casey, Dickerson and the Consequences of Pragmatic
Adjudications, 2002 UTAH L. REV. 53, 54 (2002); Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Economic
Perspective: An Economic Analysis of the Supreme Court’s Doctrine of Precedent, 78 N.C. L. REV.
643, 648 (2000); Robert von Moschzisker, Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort, 37 HARV. L.
REV. 409, 410 (1924). This argument, of course, requires the cost of revisiting the issue to be
balanced against the cost of researching precedent. See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING
LAW 125 (1999).
102. Indeed, these are standard arguments made in favor of issue preclusion when cases
involve the same parties. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980) (“[R]es judicata and
collateral estoppel relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial
resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication.”);
Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979); 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 46, §
4403.
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One standard justification of stare decisis does usefully
distinguish preclusion and precedent: the value of reliance.103 From
this standpoint, the binding nature of precedent on third parties is
precisely the point. In order to induce reliance on court decisions
through the operation of stare decisis, we are willing to accept the
increased impact on nonparties’ abilities to challenge those
decisions.104 Precisely because decisions do not bind nonparties
generally, due process prohibits case-by-case exceptions. Drawing
this line between preclusion and precedent recognizes that the
distinction is mostly a matter of labels.105 Decisions for which it is
valuable to bind nonparties earn the label of precedent. Decisions for
which it is not valuable to bind nonparties are merely preclusive.
Noting the difference in terminology, though, does not answer
the functional question. For which types of court decisions is the
value of binding nonparties sufficiently high that it overcomes the
due process bar? A full typology is impossible, of course, but one
central result involves the number of nonparties affected. When a

103. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 856 (1992); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828
(1991); Moragne, 398 U.S. at 403.
104. Courts have recognized a wide range of interests under the third Mathews prong as
supporting a reduced right to process. The first category of interest that courts have
recognized as undermining the need for additional process is the simple cost of that process.
Procedure is not free, and gains in accuracy come at an administrative cost. Along these lines,
the Court recently rejected a challenge to Ohio’s process for designating inmates for solitary
confinement without the opportunity to call witnesses in a pre-designation hearing, in part
because of the expense of providing more extensive procedural opportunities. Wilkinson v.
Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 227 (2005); see also Los Angeles v. David, 538 U.S. 715 (2003). A
second common justification for a reduction in process is exigency. In Doehr, the Court
recognized that in cases where additional process poses a risk that the burdened party will
endure additional injury in the interim, deprivation without a hearing may be appropriate.
Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 16 (1991). Similarly, in Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924
(1997), the Court recognized that the need to quickly remove a police officer facing criminal
charges justified a lack of a preremoval hearing. Finally, on occasion, courts have recognized a
version of reliance as supporting reduced process in the third Mathews step. See Grayson v.
King, 460 F.3d 1328, 1342 (11th Cir. 2006) (governmental interest in finality at third
Mathews step); Foss v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 161 F.3d 584, 589–90 (9th Cir. 1998)
(finding the government had an interest in establishing strict application deadlines for access to
a fisheries pool in order to maintain predictability and a stable market value).
105. The Seventh Circuit has expressed a version of this view: “It is res judicata that bars
the same party from relitigating a case after final judgment . . . . It is stare decisis that bars a
different party from obtaining the overruling of a decision. The existence of different parties is
assumed by the doctrine, rather than being something . . . outside its reach.” Bethesda
Lutheran Homes & Servs., Inc. v. Born, 238 F.3d 853, 858 (7th Cir. 2001) (citations
omitted); see also Barrett, supra note 11, at 1041 (noting that Bethesda “asserts that the whole
point of stare decisis is to function as a kind of nonparty preclusion”).
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court decision can affect a large number of nonparties, thus
potentially inducing reliance, the label “precedent” and the resulting
nonparty preclusion make sense.106 When a decision only matters to a
small group, there is little value in binding nonparties because few
nonparties will rely on the result. This analysis explains the difference
between the treatment of historical facts and legislative facts.
Consider the traffic light example discussed earlier. In that example,
the only other person with an interest in the result is the third party
bringing a later lawsuit; there is little, if any, reliance benefit in
making the prior decision binding. By contrast, the decisions on
social science data in Brown bind widely and induce reliance as a
result.
Indeed, the Court has already adopted a version of this analysis
in some of its earliest jurisprudence on procedural due process,
arising in the context of administrative law. In Bi-Metallic Investment
Co. v. State Board of Equalization107 and Londoner v. City and
County of Denver,108 the Court wrestled with the application of
procedural due process to local administrative decision-making. In
Londoner, the Court struck down a property tax assessment for street
improvements where those affected by the tax did not receive notice
or a hearing.109 In contrast, in Bi-Metallic, the Court rejected a due
process challenge to a broad-based increase in the valuation of all
property, establishing a rule that due process rights are reduced
when the deprivation applies broadly rather than narrowly.110
“Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people, it is
impracticable that everyone should have a direct voice in its
adoption. . . . There must be a limit to individual argument in such
matters if government is to go on.”111 Bi-Metallic thus represents a
very early example of Mathews balancing.112 When the costs of

106. In the related context of the law-fact distinction, Ronald J. Allen and Michael S.
Pardo draw a similar line between “matters of general import and highly specific and localized
phenomena.” Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97
NW. U. L. REV. 1769, 1770 (2002).
107. 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
108. 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
109. Id. at 386.
110. 239 U.S. at 444.
111. Id. at 445. The Court distinguished Londoner precisely because it established a legal
rule that applied narrowly to a small group of people rather than broadly. Id.
112. Some courts incorrectly describe Bi-Metallic as establishing a rule that due process
protections simply do not apply to broad-based policy decisions. See Jackson Court
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additional process are too high, deprivation can take place without
allowing a hearing. The value of a broad rule of behavior applying
generally overpowers the individual right of personalized
adjudication. Similarly, when court decisions apply broadly and the
reliance values are high, we treat them as precedent rather than
merely preclusive.
Aside from the number of nonparties affected by the decision,
Taylor itself recognizes that particular substantive areas of law may
involve heightened reliance interests. Although the Taylor Court did
not explicitly discuss its due process analysis in terms of Mathews, the
Court’s six exceptions to the general rule of nonparty preclusion can
be seen as an application of the Mathews framework.113 In three of
the Taylor categories (litigation by proxy, assumption of control, and
adequate representation), the nonparty being precluded received
additional process when compared to the ordinary nonparty,
indicating a reduced due process concern under the second Mathews
prong, while a party agreeing to be bound waives his due process
rights. In the last two categories, involving cases of a preexisting
substantive legal relationship between the nonparty and a party, i.e.,
those in privity with a party, and those involving specialized statutory
schemes, such as probate or bankruptcy, reliance is the central notion
that permits nonparty preclusion. As the Court notes, the need to
bind those in privity with parties arose in order to establish clear title
to property.114 Nonparties in privity are not bound because they
received additional process; they are bound because the societal value
in binding them is increased compared to the ordinary case. The
Condos., Inc. v. New Orleans, 874 F.2d 1070, 1074 (5th Cir. 1989) (“[I]t is well established
law that once an action is characterized as legislative, procedural due process requirements do
not apply.”); U.S. Labor Party v. Oremus, 619 F.2d 683, 690 (7th Cir. 1980) (“No process is
required where, as here, a legislative enactment is used to affect the property of an
individual.”); Rogin v. Bensalem Twp., 616 F.2d 680, 693 (3d Cir. 1980) (“Long ago, the
Supreme Court decided that the protections of procedural due process do not extend to
legislative actions.”). Bi-Metallic, though, is explicit in holding that due process requirements
apply but are met through the political process rather than individual adjudication. 239 U.S. at
445; see also O’Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Home, 447 U.S. 773, 802 (1980) (Blackmun,
J., concurring) (applying Mathews-style balancing in connection with Bi-Metallic).
113. Taylor v. Sturgell, 128 S. Ct. 2161, 2172–74 (2008).
114. The privity exceptions “originated ‘as much from the needs of property law as from
the values of preclusion by judgment.’” Id. at 2172 (quoting 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note
46, § 4448). Wright and Miller go on to explain that “[i]n each case, the underlying analysis
begins with the requirements of sound property relationships. Preclusion is extended or denied
in an effort to protect conflicting property interests rather than an effort to implement
concepts of participation or representation.” Id.
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specialized statutory schemes such as probate and bankruptcy are
similar in that they involved increased reliance interests. Both are
designed to extinguish all claims on the probate or bankruptcy estate
in a fixed period of time and because of this enhanced reliance value,
the decisions are allowed to bind nonparties.
This notion of nonparty reliance as the central purpose of stare
decisis appears in the interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure as well. Federal Rules 19 and 24 contain virtually identical
language that the federal courts have interpreted very differently.
Rule 19 governs compulsory party joinder: a person is “required to
be joined if feasible” if, among other requirements, the person
“claims an interest relating to the action and is so situated that
disposing of the action in the person’s absence may as a practical
matter impair or impede the person’s ability to protect the
interest.”115 Rule 24(a) governs intervention as a matter of right: the
court must permit a person to intervene who “claims an interest
relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the
action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a
practical matter impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its
interest.”116 The current versions of both rules were adopted in 1966
and were consciously drafted to use identical language.117
Under both Rule 19 and Rule 24, parties have argued that the
stare decisis effect of having a lawsuit proceed in their absence would
impair their ability to protect their interests. Under Rule 24, this
argument has succeeded in multiple circuits.118 This split in authority
115. FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a)(1).
116. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2).
117. FED. R. CIV. P. 24 advisory committee’s note; FED. R. CIV. P. 19 advisory
committee’s note; Benjamin Kaplan, The Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 400 (1967).
118. See Huber v. Taylor, 532 F.3d 237, 250 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[T]he requirements of
Rule 19(a) are not satisfied simply because a judgment against Defendants in this action might
set a persuasive precedent in any potential future action . . . .”); Schulman v. J.P. Morgan Inv.
Mgmt., Inc., 35 F.3d 799, 805 (3d Cir. 1994); Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc. v. Shepard
Niles, Inc., 11 F.3d 399, 407 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[W]e are not inclined to hold that any
potential effect the doctrine [of stare decisis] may have on an absent party’s rights makes the
absent party’s joinder compulsory . . . .”); NGV Gaming, Ltd. v. Upstream Point Molate,
LLC, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1061 (N.D. Cal. 2005); Bellaire Corp. v. Apfel, No. C-2-99-532, 2000
WL 33910112, at *2 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (“[T]he threat of negative precedent is not enough to
require compulsive joinder.”). But see Pulitzer-Polster v. Pulitzer, 784 F.2d 1305, 1310 (5th
Cir. 1986). The cases relying on the effect of stare decisis as grounds for joinder under Rule 19
often involve other additional factors indicating that the decision might have an impact on the
nonparty. See Acton Co. v. Bachman Foods, 668 F.2d 76, 78 (1st Cir. 1982) (combination of
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makes little sense from a textual standpoint, but is perfectly
reasonable given the purpose of stare decisis as a doctrine of
inducing nonparty reliance. Allowing a nonparty to join a lawsuit
based on the potential precedential effect recognizes the real
consequences of stare decisis, but treating a nonparty as required due
to the stare decisis impact of a judgment is nonsensical since the
central purpose of stare decisis is to have precisely such an effect.
IV. DUE PROCESS CONSTRAINTS ON STARE DECISIS
So what? When you started reading this Article, you probably
thought stare decisis was constitutional and you (perhaps) have been
convinced that you were right. The focus on Mathews and the role of
due process, though, changes the framework through which we see
stare decisis. Two implications flow from the Mathews analysis. First,
as argued above, the key difference between preclusion and
precedent comes at the third step, through the value of nonparty
reliance. We accept the impact on third parties as part of the effort to
create legal rules on which people can rely. This result means,
though, that reliance takes a new central role. In particular, the
Supreme Court has traditionally viewed reliance as a discretionary
policy concern. However, when seen through the lens of Mathews,
reliance becomes mandatory. Unless the decision in the first suit can
and does induce nonparty reliance, stare decisis and preclusion are
not different and precedent can run afoul of the due process clause.
Stare decisis cannot be saved in cases where reliance is low.
Second, if due process constrains both precedent and preclusion,
in situations where parties may raise due process challenges to the
binding effects of judgments, nonparties must be able to challenge
their precedential effect. Specifically, we generally permit parties to
obtain relief from judgments issued by judges who were corrupt. I
examine the application of this anticorruption rule in connection
with two famous cases of judicial bribery: the Martin Manton scandal
on the Second Circuit in the 1930s and the Oklahoma Supreme
Court bribery scandal of the 1960s.119
preclusion and stare decisis); Rotella v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., No. 3:08-CV-0486-G, 2008
WL 5272787, at *2 (N.D. Tex. 2008) (combination of stare decisis and preclusion); Tycom
Corp. v. Redactron Corp., 380 F. Supp. 1183, 1190 (D. Del. 1974) (combination of stare
decisis and contractual rights).
119. Of course, these are hardly the only changes that might result from an explicit focus
on reliance interests. See Barrett, supra note 11, at 1063–64 (noting that reliance interests
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A. Reliance, Stare Decisis, and Due Process
The idea that stare decisis is closely linked to reliance is hardly a
new concept. Reliance is one of the standard and oldest justifications
for the binding effect of precedent. Nineteenth-century case law
tended to focus on reliance in the context of property and contract
law. Historical analysis has identified this trend in the stare decisis
tradition of both the United States Supreme Court120 and state
courts.121 More recently, the Supreme Court’s decision in Casey
recognized the importance of noneconomic societal reliance. “[F]or
two decades of economic and social developments, people have
organized intimate relationships and made choices that define their
views of themselves and their places in society, in reliance on the
availability of abortion in the event that contraception should fail.”122
Since Casey, the Supreme Court has continued to identify societal
reliance as a relevant factor in the stare decisis calculation. The
Supreme Court reaffirmed the ongoing vitality of Miranda v.
Arizona123 in Dickerson v. United States124 based on its widespread
societal acceptance.125 In Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court
overruled Bowers v. Hardwick,126 relying in part on the absence of
noneconomic reliance.127

might vary based on which court issued an opinion and the extent to which a decision conflicts
with prior precedent).
120. See Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to
the Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REV. 645, 699 (1999).
121. See Polly J. Price, A Constitutional Significance for Precedent: Originalism, Stare
Decisis and Property Rights, 5 AVE MARIA L. REV. 113, 119 (2007) (“The evidence here
suggests that most state judges in the formative era did consider judicial abandonment of
precedent potentially to be a retroactive impairment of property rights.”).
122. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992).
123. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
124. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
125. Id. at 443 (“We do not think there is such justification for overruling Miranda.
Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings
have become part of our national culture.”). Similarly, in Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 244
(2006), the Court refused to overrule Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), on the theory that
Congress and state legislatures relied on the decision in drafting legislation.
126. 478 U.S. 186 (1985).
127. 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (“The holding of Bowers, however, has not induced
detrimental reliance comparable to some instances where recognized individual rights are
involved. Indeed, there has been no individual or societal reliance on Bowers of the sort that
could counsel against overturning its holding once there are compelling reasons to do so.”).
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This notion of noneconomic-societal reliance has been the
subject of much academic discussion128—a dispute outside the scope
of this Article. Regardless of the type of interest that counts for
reliance purposes, the central result of a due process view on
precedent is that reliance is mandatory for applying stare decisis,
rather than a discretionary factor in the decision of whether to
overrule a prior case. The Supreme Court has generally discussed
reliance as one of the special justifications counseling against
overruling prior erroneous decisions.129 A due process framework
takes stare decisis and elevates it. Rather than failing to overrule
incorrect decisions if reliance exists, courts need to ask if reliance is
present before allowing an erroneous decision to bind.
In order to see the effect of this changed perspective, consider
two decisions widely viewed as wrongly decided, but followed on a
stare decisis theory even though reliance is absent. In Marshall v.
Marshall130 and Ankenbrandt v. Richards,131 the Supreme Court
recently evaluated the probate and domestic relations exceptions to
federal jurisdiction. In both cases, the Court was confronted with
dubious old precedent, which it accepted primarily based on stare
decisis. In 1859, the Supreme Court had stated in Barber v. Barber,
“We disclaim altogether any jurisdiction in the courts of the United
States upon the subject of divorce, or for the allowance of
alimony.”132 Similarly, in the 1946 decision in Markham v. Allen, the
Supreme Court denied federal courts “jurisdiction to probate a will
128. See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 93 (2004);
Consovoy, supra note 101, at 64; Tom Hardy, Note, Has Mighty Casey Struck Out?: Societal
Reliance and the Supreme Court’s Modern Stare Decisis Analysis, 34 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
591, 594 (2006).
129. See Randall, 548 U.S. at 244 (stating that “[d]eparture from precedent is
exceptional and requires ‘special justification’” and identifying reliance as one factor to
consider); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–61 (1992) (listing reliance along
with workability, undermining by subsequent cases, and changed facts as one of many factors
to consider in the stare decisis analysis); Moragne v. States Marine Lines Inc., 398 U.S. 375,
403 (1969).
130. 547 U.S. 293 (2006). Marshall arguably did not approve the probate exception.
The Supreme Court instead assumed a probate exception existed but decided that the case
before fell outside the scope of any such exception. Id. at 308. Despite this approach, the
circuits have read Marshall as reaffirming the existence of a probate exception and have
dismissed cases as a result. See, e.g., Three Keys Ltd. v. SR Util. Holding Co., 540 F.3d 220,
229 (3d Cir. 2008); Lefkowitz v. Bank of N.Y., 528 F.3d 102, 107 (2d Cir. 2007); Wisecarver
v. Moore, 489 F.3d 747 (6th Cir. 2007).
131. 504 U.S. 689 (1992).
132. 62 U.S. 582, 584 (1858); see also Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 694.
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or administer an estate.”133 As a matter of first impression, the
traditional tools of statutory interpretation would suggest that these
decisions are almost certainly incorrect. Both doctrines establish freefloating exceptions to federal court jurisdiction. However, the
jurisdictional statutes in both cases (like all of the federal
jurisdictional statutes) are written broadly,134 and do not include any
exception for probate or domestic relations cases. The primary
argument that this nontextual reading should control is that the
1789 Judiciary Act was intended to exclude from the equity
jurisdiction of the federal courts those matters in which the English
chancery courts lacked jurisdiction.135 This claim, though, is very
likely a misreading of English history.136
Despite the weakness of the prior precedent, both Marshall and
Ankenbrandt declined to overrule it on stare decisis grounds.137
Explicitly in Ankenbrandt, and implicitly in Marshall, the Court
viewed this decision as a policy choice,138 declining to find
jurisdiction based on the “special proficiency”139 of state courts in
resolving these types of matters. Neither case discusses any reliance

133. 326 U.S. 490, 494 (1946); see also Marshall, 547 U.S. at 310.
134. Jurisdiction in Barber was based on the diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006),
while Markham was brought by officers of the United States, and thus jurisdiction was
appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1345. See Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490, 491–92 (1946);
Barber, 62 U.S. at 584.
135. See Marshall, 547 U.S. at 308; Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 699–700; Markham, 326
U.S. at 494.
136. See Marshall, 547 U.S. at 316 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring) (pointing out that Bleak
House discusses a probate case in chancery); Peter Nicolas, Fighting the Probate Mafia: A
Dissection of the Probate Exception to Federal Court Jurisdiction, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1479, 1508
(2001) (discussing history of chancery jurisdiction over probate cases); Naomi R. Cahn, Family
Law, Federalism, and the Federal Courts, 79 IOWA L. REV. 1073, 1089–90 (1994) (discussing
history underlying domestic relations exception).
137. 547 U.S. at 308–09; 504 U.S. at 700. Both the probate and the domestic relations
exemptions have been widely identified as cases where the Court veered from the traditional
tools of statutory interpretation based on concerns of stare decisis. See, e.g., Peter J. Smith,
Textualism and Jurisdiction, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1883, 1928 (2008) (noting both
Ankenbrandt and Marshall are “atextual”); Nicolas, supra note 136, at 1483–85 (describing
the rationale for the probate exception as “mired in confusion” and arguing for a legislative
override); Wilson R. Huhn, Teaching Legal Analysis Using a Pluralistic Model of Law, 36
GONZ. L. REV. 433, 471 (2001) (noting the “sharp conflict between text and precedent” in
Ankenbrandt); Cahn, supra note 136, at 1083–87 (critiquing Ankenbrandt).
138. “Not only is our conclusion rooted in respect for this long-held understanding, it is
also supported by sound policy considerations.” Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 703; see also
Marshall, 547 U.S. at 308.
139. Marshall, 547 U.S. at 308; Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 704.
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interest in the prior decision, and it would be difficult to take a claim
about such reliance interest seriously. Whether viewed through an
economic lens or a social reliance lens, it is difficult to imagine
anyone shaping their conduct based on the absence of federal
jurisdiction in these types of cases, either explicitly or as a
background norm.140 Applying the Mathews analysis of due process,
these cases become impossible to distinguish from issue preclusion.
Due process prohibits binding nonparties to the decisions in Barber
and Markham. While inducing reliance interests generally provides
the public benefit that permits binding nonparties as a matter of stare
decisis, such reliance is absent here, so precedent collapses into issue
preclusion and due process prohibits it from binding.
B. Stare Decisis, Due Process, and Corrupt Process
Collapsing the distinction between preclusion and precedent also
eliminates the distinction between those bound by the stare decisis
impact of decisions and those bound directly by the judgment. When
the process in the initial suit was corrupt, litigants cannot be bound
by the judgment. For instance, the Supreme Court has made clear
that when judges have a direct financial stake in the outcome of a
case, due process prohibits their participation in the decision.141
Quite sensibly, judgments made by judicial officers who accept
bribes cannot be binding on litigants without running afoul of the
Constitution. This section looks at the effect of those same decisions
on nonlitigants, analyzing the stare decisis effects of corrupt
decisions on nonparties. First, I examine the case of Martin Manton,
a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit. Manton accepted bribes from litigants in a number of cases
over a series of years. Second, I consider the bribery scandal on the
Oklahoma Supreme Court that came to light in the mid-1960s,
where multiple judges accepted payments for the deciding vote.
140. The Supreme Court in both Marshall and Ankenbrandt relied in part on the fact
that Congress had failed to overrule the prior statutory interpretation. See Marshall, 547 U.S.
at 307; Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 703. Whatever validity this argument has generally, it is
especially weak in cases involving jurisdictional statutes where Congress is very unlikely to pay
much attention to the interpretation. Even if this argument is correct here, this is not a reliance
argument, simply an argument that stare decisis does not apply. If Congress approves of the
interpretation, it means that it was the correct reading of the statute, not that it should be
followed even though it was in error.
141. See Aetna Ins. Co. v LaVoie, 475 U.S. 813, 824 (1986) (holding that judges with a
direct, pecuniary interest in a case must be recused as a matter of due process).
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I argue that, as the bribed decisions are invalid with respect to the
parties before the court, they are equally invalid with respect to
nonparties.
1. Martin Manton
Before the bribery scandal that led to his resignation, Martin
Manton was one of the most influential judges in the country.142 His
strong connections to the New York Tammany Hall machine led to
early, prestigious judicial appointments.143 In 1916, President Wilson
appointed Manton to the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York when he was only thirty-six, making
him the youngest federal judge in the country.144 Eighteen months
after his appointment to the district bench, he was elevated to the
Second Circuit.145 In 1923, President Harding seriously considered
Manton for the seat on the United States Supreme Court left open
by the resignation of William Day.146 Members of both the bench
and the bar strongly opposed the potential appointment. Judge
Learned Hand and Chief Justice Taft both were openly negative
about Manton and the Judiciary Committee of the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York was unanimously against the
147
appointment. In part due to this opposition, Harding appointed
Pierce Butler instead.148
Manton became the presiding judge of the Second Circuit after
twelve years on the court.149 As a result of the Great Depression,
Manton began to take out large loans from (among others)
individuals with cases pending before the Circuit.150 “In the period

142. For general background on the Manton scandal, see, e.g., JOSEPH BORKIN, THE
CORRUPT JUDGE: AN INQUIRY INTO BRIBERY AND OTHER HIGH CRIMES AND
MISDEMEANORS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 25 (Potter 1962); GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED
HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 503–13 (Knopf 1994); JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., BRIBES
567–71 (MacMillan 1984); and Allan T. Vestal, A Study In Perfidy, 35 IND. L.J. 17 (1959).
143. See GUNTHER, supra note 142, at 503; NOONAN, supra note 142, at 567.
144. NOONAN, supra note 142, at 567.
145. See GUNTHER, supra note 142, at 503; NOONAN, supra note 142, at 567.
146. See GUNTHER, supra note 142, at 503; NOONAN, supra note 142, at 567.
147. See GUNTHER, supra note 142, at 503; NOONAN, supra note 142, at 567.
148. See GUNTHER, supra note 142, at 503; NOONAN, supra note 142, at 567.
149. See Vestal, supra note 142, at 18.
150. Id. at 22. In 1934, Manton’s net worth increased by about $1.5 million dollars,
turning $750,000 dollars in debt into $750,000 in assets. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST,
GRAND INQUESTS 123 (1992).
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1932–1938, Manton . . . received large sums of money from litigants
in at least a dozen cases.”151 The Manton scandal initially broke on
January 27, 1939, in an article in the New York World-Telegram.152
Two days later, Thomas Dewey, the District Attorney for New York
County, disclosed a letter he had sent to the Chair of the House
Judiciary Committee, identifying six incidents since 1932 in which
Manton received money from parties with cases pending before the
circuit.153 Manton resigned almost immediately.154
While resignation had customarily provided protection against
charges,155 Manton was indicted in April 1939 for conspiracy to
defraud the United States.156 The indictment identified six Second
Circuit cases in which Manton had allegedly taken bribes from
litigants.157 Manton was convicted after a short trial, was sentenced
to two years in prison, and was fined.158 Due to the disqualification
of most of the Second Circuit, a special panel was convened to hear
Manton’s appeal.159 The Circuit affirmed160 and Manton served
seventeen months in prison.161

151. NOONAN, supra note 142, at 568. The total amount of money at issue is unclear,
with estimates ranging from $435,000 to $600,000. Id.; Vestal, supra note 142, at 41, n.156.
152. See GUNTHER, supra note 142, at 504.
153. See id.; Dewey Says Judge Manton Got $400,000 From Litigants; Sends Charges to
Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1939, at 1. Gunther suggests that Dewey sent the letter
because the two-year statute of limitations on the potential state law charge, income tax
evasion, would prevent prosecution on most of the payments. GUNTHER, supra note 142, at
504.
154. Manton Quits as Federal Judge; Defends His Business Deals, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31,
1939, at 1.
155. NOONAN, supra note 142, at 568.
156. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006); NOONAN, supra note 142, at 568; Vestal, supra note 142,
at 40.
157. See BORKIN, supra note 142, at 44–45; Vestal, supra note 142, at 40. The six cases
were Schick Dry Shaver, Inc. v. Dictograph Products Co., 89 F.2d 643 (2d Cir. 1937); United
States ex rel. Lotsch v. Kelly, 86 F.2d 613 (2d Cir. 1936); Smith v. Hall, 83 F.2d 217 (2d Cir.
1936); General Motors Corp. v. Preferred Electric & Wire Corp., 79 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1935);
Elec. Auto-Lite Co. v. P. & D. Manufacturing Co., 78 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1935); and Art Metal
Works, Inc. v. Abraham & Straus, Inc., 70 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1934). See United States v.
Manton, 107 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1939).
158. GUNTHER, supra note 142, at 506.
159. The panel consisted of retired United States Supreme Court Justice George
Sutherland, Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, and Second Circuit Judge Charles E. Clark, who took
the bench in March 1939, after Manton left the court. See Vestal, supra note 142, at 43 n.167;
GUNTHER, supra note 142, at 505.
160. United States v. Manton, 107 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1939).
161. NOONAN, supra note 142, at 569.
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After the scandal was revealed, the Second Circuit was
confronted with the question of how to handle the cases in which
Manton had taken bribes. The Court generally granted rehearing
and reviewed the decision with a new panel.162 Substantial efforts
were made to make whole those injured by the judicial misconduct.
In Art Metal Works, Inc. v. Abraham & Straus, Inc.,163 Manton
wrote an opinion holding that a patent holder forfeited its right to
sue for patent infringement by overstating the holding in a prior
decision in its favor.164 Manton had accepted a bribe from the
victorious party on the day of the decision.165 The Second Circuit
not only reversed the decision on rehearing,166 accepting Judge
Learned Hand’s original dissenting opinion as the new opinion of
the court, but Art Metal Works also successfully petitioned Congress
for a seven-year extension of the patent term as a result of the delay
between the 1932 initial decision and the 1939 reversal on
rehearing.167
But what about the stare decisis effect of the bribed decisions?
Before the bribery was revealed, courts cited the decisions in which
Manton took bribes, binding nonparties to the result. Consider, for
example, Electric Auto-Lite Co. v. P. & D. Manufacturing Co., in
which Manton accepted loans facilitated by counsel for P. & D.
Manufacturing, the defendant accused of unfair competition and
patent infringement.168 Electric Auto-Lite, of course, received
rehearing when the scandal was revealed.169 In the interim, though,
the decision was binding to the detriment of other litigants. In

162. See, e.g., Elec. Auto-Lite Co. v. P. & D. Mfg. Co., 78 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1935) on
reh’g, 109 F.2d 566, 567 (2d Cir. 1940) (per curiam); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Preferred Elec. &
Wire Corp., 79 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1935), on reh’g, 109 F.2d 615 (2d Cir. 1940) (per curiam);
Art Metal Works, Inc. v. Abraham & Straus, Inc., 70 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1934), on reh’g, 107
F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1939).
163. 70 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1934).
164. Id. at 639–40.
165. GUNTHER, supra note 142, at 508.
166. Art Metal Works, Inc. v. Abraham & Straus, Inc., 107 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1939).
167. See BORKIN, supra note 142, at 59; Tyler T. Ochoa, Patent and Copyright Term
Extension and the Constitution: A Historical Perspective, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC. 19, 73 &
n.338 (2001).
168. See Vestal, supra note 142, at 31–32; United States v. Manton, 107 F.2d 834, 844
(2d Cir. 1939).
169. Elec. Auto-Lite Co. v. P. & D. Mfg. Co., 109 F.2d 566 (2d. Cir. 1940) (per
curiam).
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Parrot Speed Fastener Corp. v. E.W. Carpenter Manufacturing Co.,170
decided just days before the bribery scandal was revealed, a plaintiff
in an unfair competition suit lost due to the precedential impact of
Electric Auto-Lite.171 If due process would require that rehearing be
granted to the plaintiff in Electric Auto-Lite itself, it should have the
same result for those parties injured by the stare decisis impact of
those decisions.
In the end, a due process perspective on stare decisis likely would
not change the result in Parrot Speed Fastener. Neither the result nor
the legal theory in Electric Auto-Lite changed on rehearing.172 There
is some reason to believe that the Second Circuit has adopted an
informal rule to avoid relying on decisions where Manton’s vote
made the difference.173 The result, of course, is not the central
question. If we are not willing to accept binding litigants to decisions
where judges were bribed, it makes little sense to bind nonparties
based on stare decisis.
2. Bribery in the Oklahoma Supreme Court
The bribery scandal on the Oklahoma Supreme Court, which
broke in the mid-1960s, has received less attention than the Manton
scandal, but it was more serious in many ways. Over the course of
170. 26 F. Supp. 622 (D. Conn. 1939).
171. Id. at 623.
172. Parrot Speed Fastener relied on Electric Auto-Lite for the proposition that copying a
product does not establish an unfair competition claim unless the purchaser is deceived. 26 F.
Supp. at 623. On rehearing, the Second Circuit reaffirmed this proposition. See Elec. Auto-Lite,
109 F.2d at 567 (“There is nothing unlawful in copying the unpatented products of another
dealer down to the last detail, except in so far as the resulting similarity may become a means
of securing his customers through their belief, so induced, that your goods are his.”).
173. See Mark V. Tushnet, Clarence Thomas: The Constitutional Problems, 63 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 466, 477 (1995) (book review) (“It is part of the lore of the Second Circuit
that one should not cite cases in which Manton’s was the deciding vote.”); Benjamin Weiser,
Hang Him Up? The Bad Judge and His Image, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2009, at A1 (“In some
ways, the legacy of Judge Manton has already been erased from the legal annals: two federal
judges in Manhattan recalled that when they were law clerks, their judges admonished them
never to cite Judge Manton’s opinions.”). If the rule exists, it is not honored consistently. The
Second Circuit has on several occasions cited cases where Manton not only was the deciding
vote, but wrote the opinion over a dissent. See, e.g., Blue Tree Hotels Inv. Can., Ltd. v.
Starwood Hotels & Resorts, Inc., 369 F.3d 212, 224 n.9 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Biddle
Purchasing Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n., 96 F.2d 687, 691 (2d Cir. 1938)); Itar-Tass Russian
News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 140 F.3d 442, 448 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Brooks v.
Mandel-Witte Co., 54 F.2d 992, 994 (2d Cir. 1932)); U.S. ex rel. Bergen Point Iron Works v.
Md. Cas. Co., 384 F.2d 303, 304 (2d Cir. 1967) (citing Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. Co. v.
Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 91 F.2d 964 (2d Cir. 1937)).
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three decades, beginning in the 1930s, at least four Justices on
Oklahoma’s highest court took bribes for favorable votes in cases.174
In 1964 and 1965, Justice Nelson Corn confessed to accepting
bribes on behalf of himself and colleagues in at least three cases175:
Marshall v. Amos,176 Selected Investment Corp. v. Oklahoma Tax
Commission,177 and Oklahoma Co. v. O’Neil.178 Justice Corn then
passed on the funds he received to those colleagues on the court
necessary to guarantee a favorable decision.179
As was true in the cases where Manton accepted bribes, the court
granted rehearing to those litigants directly affected by the bribes,
but there was no consideration for those merely affected by the stare
decisis effect of the decisions. Take, for instance, Oklahoma Co. v.
O’Neil180 and Marshall v. Amos.181 In O’Neil, a group of Florida and
Massachusetts investors had purchased shares of an Oklahoma oil
and gas lease from the Oklahoma Company.182 The investors argued
that they were entitled to rescind the purchase on the grounds that
the husband-and-wife owners of the Oklahoma Company had
fraudulently induced the investment by overstating the value of the
leases.183 The trial court found for the investors but the Oklahoma
Supreme Court reversed in a 5 to 4 decision, concluding that the
investors were not entitled to make use of oral representations when
there was a written contract.184 Justice Corn later confessed that the
father of one of the owners of the Oklahoma Company paid him
$7,500 and he shared the funds equally with two colleagues on the
court, both of whom voted for reversal.185 After the bribery scandal
174. See Johnson v. Johnson, 424 P.2d 414 (Okla. 1967); WILLIAM A. BARRY & JAMES
EDWIN ALEXANDER, JUSTICE FOR SALE: SHOCKING SCANDAL OF OKLAHOMA SUPREME
COURT (1996); Malcom Hall, Note, Courts: Scandal in the Oklahoma Supreme Court, 20
OKLA. L. REV. 417, 418 (1967); Oklahoma’s Shocking Scandal, TIME MAG., Apr. 16, 1965.
The bribes were initially only paid for a sixth vote on the nine-judge court, but by the mid1950s, Justices were paid to decide cases outright. See Hall, supra at 418.
175. See BARRY & ALEXANDER, supra note 174, at 158–59; Hall, supra note 174, at 418.
176. 300 P.2d 990 (Okla. 1955).
177. 309 P.2d 267 (Okla. 1957).
178. 333 P.2d 534 (Okla. 1958).
179. See BARRY & ALEXANDER, supra note 174, at 4.
180. 333 P.2d 534 (Okla. 1958).
181. 300 P.2d 990 (Okla. 1955).
182. See O’Neil, 333 P.2d at 538; BARRY & ALEXANDER, supra note 174, at 182.
183. See O’Neil, 333 P.2d at 538; BARRY & ALEXANDER, supra note 174, at 182.
184. See O’Neil, 333 P.2d at 545–46; BARRY & ALEXANDER, supra note 174, at 182.
185. See O’Neil, 333 P.2d at 545–46; BARRY & ALEXANDER, supra note 174, at 183.
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was revealed, the original decision was vacated and on rehearing, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision that
the investment had been fraudulently induced.186
Marshall v. Amos187 followed a similar path. The case also
involved a fraud claim in connection with oil leases. The trial court
concluded that the defendants had defrauded plaintiffs of their
royalties and held that a constructive trust had been created for the
benefit of the plaintiffs.188 The Supreme Court reversed, again in a 5
to 4 decision, concluding that the standards for a constructive trust
had not been met.189 Justice Corn, though, admitted to receiving
$4,000 as a bribe to vote for the defendants and the case was vacated
in 1968.190 The Oklahoma Supreme Court issued a decision
affirming the trial court on rehearing in 1970.191
For both of these cases, in the decade or more between the initial
decision and the court’s subsequent reversal on rehearing, these
decisions were viewed as binding192 and litigants lost in part because
of the cases’ precedential effect. For instance, in Perdue v.
Hartman193 the Oklahoma Supreme Court concluded that Marshall,
among other cases, established a high standard for the creation of a
constructive trust that was not met.194 Along the same lines, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court in Albert & Harlow, Inc. v. Fitzgerald195
concluded that O’Neil barred the introduction of parol evidence in
connection with a written contract and reversed the trial court’s
finding in favor of the defendant.196 To the extent that the corrupt
decisions precluded litigants by precedent, they were as entitled to
rehearing as the parties directly involved in Marshall and O’Neil.

186. Oklahoma Co. v. O’Neil, 440 P.2d. 978 (Okla. 1968).
187. Marshall v. Amos, 300 P.2d 990 (Okla. 1955).
188. Id. at 994.
189. Id. at 990.
190. 442 P.2d 500 (Okla. 1968).
191. 471 P.2d 896 (Okla. 1970).
192. See, e.g., Hill v. Field, 384 F.2d 829, 833 n.5 (10th Cir. 1967) (relying on O’Neil as
establishing Oklahoma law); Peter Fox Brewing v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 189 F. Supp. 743
(C.D. Ill. 1961) (relying on O’Neil as establishing Oklahoma law); Barry v. Frizzell, 371 P.2d
460, 463 (Okla. 1962) (quoting Marshall, 300 P.2d at 994).
193. 408 P.2d 293 (Okla. 1965).
194. Id. at 297.
195. 389 P.2d 994, 996 (Okla. 1964).
196. Id. at 997.
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Such a result would not dramatically undermine the rule of law.
As was true in the Manton cases, rehearing likely would not have
changed the result. The central holding of Marshall relied on in
Perdue was that a constructive trust could not be established by a
preponderance of the evidence, but instead required a higher level of
proof.197 This is an accurate statement of trust law as a general matter
and contemporaneous cases in Oklahoma reached the same result.198
Albert & Harlow, Inc. saw O’Neil as holding that absent fraud or
mistake, written contracts supersede prior oral discussions and parol
evidence cannot change the terms of a written agreement,199 a
version of the parol evidence rule that is uncontroversial.200
Moreover, the fact that some litigants are entitled to rehearing
does not reopen decisions broadly to collateral attack. In the
Oklahoma cases, the Supreme Court drew a distinction between
those cases where bribes had been known to take place and those
where the corrupt judges were the deciding vote but no bribery was
known. Litigants were not able to disqualify the judges in 5 to 4
decisions of the Oklahoma Supreme Court merely because there
were bribes in unrelated cases.201 In the cases where no known bribes
took place, the judgments retain their preclusive value and as a
result, they should retain their stare decisis effect as well.
V. CONCLUSION
The core claim of this Article is that from the standpoint of due
process, preclusion and precedent operate identically on nonparties.
Stare decisis survives while preclusion fails precisely because it has a
broad impact and allows nonparties to shape their conduct with the
expectation that precedent will bind them and others. Since
preclusion does not generally apply to those not before the courts, it
fails to provide the reliance benefits that allow precedent to survive.
This approach shifts the analysis from a formalist view on
preclusion and stare decisis to a functional one. Ronald J. Allen and
197. 408 P.2d at 297.
198. See G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, § 472 (2d
ed. 1978); Starnes v. Barker, 340 P.2d 463, 465 (Okla. 1959) (“It is also well settled in this
jurisdiction that a constructive trust cannot arise from presumption but must be established by
clear, unequivocal and decisive evidence.”).
199. Albert & Harlow, Inc., 389 P.2d at 996.
200. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 214–15 (1981).
201. See Johnson v. Johnson, 424 P.2d 414, 418 (Okla. 1967).
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Michael S. Pardo have taken a similar approach in drawing the
distinction between law and fact.202 They argue that functional
considerations, e.g., the relationship between the judge and the jury,
determine whether an issue is labeled as legal or factual.203 The same
analysis applies here. Stare decisis is allowed to bind nonparties
because that is exactly the function of a doctrine of precedent.

202. Allen & Pardo, supra note 106.
203. Id. at 1770 (“[T]he quest to find ‘the’ essential difference between the two that can
control subsequent classifications of questions as legal or factual is doomed from the start, as
there is no essential difference. . . . [F]unctional considerations underlie the decision to label
any given issue ‘legal’ or ‘factual.’”).
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